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The legal status of the
psychologist in the courtroom
BY MICHAEL L. PERLIN, ESQ.
In discussing the legal status of the psychologist in the
courtroom, the more important but hidden issue of the social
status of the psychologist must also be explored. Thus,
although psychologists now routinely testify as expert
witnesses on a whole range of issues in criminal and civil
matters, a perception lingers in the minds of judges and jurors
that the psychologist is a "second-rate" expert compared to the
forensic psychiatrist. The roots of this assumption are
examined, and it is suggested that psychologists themselves
have helped perpetuate this myth. On the other hand,
psychologists clearly do have special skills and techniques
uniquely preparing them for certain courtroom work; in
addition, participation in the judicial process enables
psychologists to serve as advocates for social change.
Psychologists must thus confront the background of the
anticourtroom bias and educate all participants in the litigation
process as to the need for appropriate psychological testimony.
In the practice of law, just as in the practice of any other
profession, trade, vocation or avocation, it is often the
folkways, mores and customs that deserve the attention
usually paid to the written rules of substance and pro-
cedure. Although thousands of words are written, for in-
stance, about the subtle points of a significant court deci-
sion or statutory revision, usually limited analysis is given
to what can be termed-somewhat inartfully, I am
afraid-the socialization of the law.
EDITORS' NOTE: This paper was presented at APA Conference,
Washington, D.C., September 1976.
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Thus, any discussion of "The Legal Status of the
Psychologist in the Courtroom" must begin with the
premise that the phrase "legal status" is really shorthand
for at least three bundles of definitions: the legal status of
the psychologist as defined by case law (i.e., when can
he/she give expert testimony); the legal roles which a
psychologist can fill (i.e., in what kinds of cases can
he/she testify); and the social status of the psychologist in
the courtroom (i.e., how he/she is viewed by the judge, the
jury, the parties, other experts and other psychologists
themselves). Although the case law is now becoming
relatively uniform and the scope of witness roles is forever
widening, it is the social status of psychologists in the
courtroom-a question normally paid little attention to-
which is probably the most important of these topics for
this conference to consider. This status-the end product
of a mixture of self-fears, denial, resistance, and the usual
gamut of ego defenses we all employ on a daily basis-is
the hidden issue that is really worthy of further explora-
tion.'
Although a smattering of early cases had held that a prop-
erly qualified psychologist could testify in a criminal trial
on questions involving mental condition or competency to
stand tria 2 or in accident disability cases on questions of
extent of neurological impairment,3 it was not until the
1962 decision of the prestigious District of Columbia
Court of Appeals in Jenkins v. United States4 that the
psychologist's legal status was given firm grounding.
In Jenkins, a criminal case in which the defendant on trial
for housebreaking with intent to assault raised the insanity
defense, the trial judge had ordered the jury to disregard
testimony of defense psychologists that the defendant
"had a mental disease" when he committed the crimes in
question because-according to the judge-"a psychologist
is not competent to give a medical opinion as to a mental
disease or defect." 5 Following the jury's conviction,
however, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the
matter for a new trial on a series of grounds, including, in-
ter alia, that that ruling by the trial judge was in error, as
"some psychologists are qualified to render expert
testimony in the field of mental disorder." 6
Judge Bazelon, speaking for a sharply divided court noted
that the appropriate test was "whether the opinion offered
will be likely to aid the trier in the search for truth."I The
answer to this test will not "depend upon [the witness']
claim to the title 'psychologist,' " the court warned.
Rather, the determination must depend "upon the nature
and extent of his knowledge. ' 9 While psychologists other-
wise employed in areas such as personnel administration or
industrial relations might not qualify to testify as to "men-
tal disease or defect," a Ph.D. in clinical psychology with
a psychiatric hospital internship and/or completion of an
APA-approved graduate training program and/or Board
certification might properly so testify. ' 0
As indicated, the opinion was far from unanimous. In a
special concurring opinion, Judge (now Chief Justice)
Warren Burger criticized Judge Bazelon's opinion for its
alleged "[failure] to give adequate guidance as to the scope
and nature of the inquiry" on remand," and listed seven
major areas of questioning-involving such areas as scope
of the specific psychologist's clinical education in
"physiological and medical subjects," his ability to
"[prescribe] or [supervise] treatment of mental patients,"
and the meaning of "clinical experience"'-which should
be covered on the remand. 3 Finally, two other judges
dissented, urging the court to accept the position of amicus
curiae American Psychiatric Association, which had
argued that psychologists should not be allowed to qualify
as experts. 14 According to the dissenters, the majority
should have listened to the "wise counsel from the only
undisputed experts now at work in the area of medical ill-
ness of the mind."" That this point of view has not en-
tirely disappeared will be pointed out later.
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Following Jenkins-a case which, by the way, met with
nearly unanimous critical endorsement in the scholarly
legal journals' 6-virtually every major criminal decision
has echoed its language, 7 thus giving stronger footing to
the psychologist's "legal status." More important, how-
ever, the acceptance of this approach literally opened the
doors to the admission of psychological testimony in a
multitude of legal areas.
Thus, psychologists now commonly testify as expert
witnesses in civil commitment matters (in cases involving
questions of retardation, acceptability of treatment involv-
ing behavior therapy, and appropriateness of place-
ments), 8 and, more increasingly, on questions involving
such questions as employment discrimination,' 9 juvenile
placements, 20  accuracy in evaluation of eyewitness
testimony,2' special education assignments, "2 effects of bi-
lingualism on children, 23 postsentencing disposition,2" ex-
tent of neurological injury,25 and even more important,
perhaps, they are beginning to testify in class actions in-
volving such fundamental issues as right to education,26
right to habilitation, 2 and right to vote. 28 By becoming in-
volved in cases such as these, psychologists are
continually-and properly-expanding their legal roles. If
as has been suggested by Cameron Fincher, the psycholog-
ical community does, indeed, evince a "consistent concern
with the social, cultural and humanistic issues as well as
the professional and technical problems," 29 then it must
critically involve itself in these roles.
However, at the same time, the pertinency of the simple
truism suggested by Bernard Diamond (an attorney) and
David Louisell (a psychiatrist) in their article on courtroom
psychiatry-that "the psychological sciences differ from
the biological sciences in that the subject matter of the
former is not visible" 3°0-is even more applicable to a dis-
cussion of forensic psychology and the role of the court-
room psychologist. What are often viewed as the "ex-
cesses" of flamboyant expert witnesses in public spectacles
such as the Hearst or Ruby trials3' become quickly
transformed into sins visited upon all expert witnesses:
regularly, papers are published denying the need for in-
volvement of "adversarial" experts in the legal adversary
process,32 direly forecasting the inevitable prostitution of
the profession,33 questioning the compatibility of psychol-
ogy, psychiatry and the courts,34 and recommending that
experts only become involved on an amicus (friend of the
court) or so-called impartial witness level." Although these
positions have been more than adequately responded to by
lawyers36 and psychiatrists,37 a backlash phenomenon is
clearly present. 38
Beyond this, however, lurks an even more disturbing prob-
lem for the forensic psychologist: not only must he/she
contend with the same basic antipathy in the courtroom
facing the psychiatrist,39 but he/she must also contend
with what is-sadly-perceived as "second-class expert"
status, when compared by judge and/or jury to the medi-
cal expert. Thus, a basic legal text points out that "a
favorite trick of cross-examination is to bring out the lack
of medical education of the clinical psychologist . . in a
voice oozing incredulity or sarcasm' ";40 elsewhere, it has
been pointed out that psychologists may be-sometimes
effectively-baited by attorneys "indirect[ly] attempt[ing]
to question [their] qualifications and competence ... by
addressing [them] always as 'Mister,' in marked contrast to
the consistent and appropriate use of the title 'Doctor.' '"'
One of the post-Jenkins decisions, alluded to above, notes,
for example, that the trial court had aked the psychologist-
witness, "You have never dissected a cadaver, have
you?"'4 2 In another more recent case, in an attempt to
discredit a clinical psychologist who had testified as a
defense witness, the prosecutor appealed to the jury to
disregard the witness' interpretation of a projective test:
Ladies and gentlemen, then we come to that ink blot .... Four-
teen responses and four of them turned out to be anatomical
things-hearts or whatever it happened to be. Is there something
unusual about that? Is a man crazy when he sees a heart or
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something else four times? . ..After all, they are just blots of
ink. Is a man crazy when he sees them? And how about that last
one, that rocket one. He says he sees a rocket going off. I asked
him, doctor, was there any rocket fired during that period of
time that might stick in a man's brain and might suggest it to
him? The doctor doesn't know. But there is something explosive
about a personality if he sees a rocket on a little ink blot.
Well, ladies and gentlemen, there is not much I can say about
that; I am not an expert .... But I can say one thing; that it is a
jury decision. It is your province. It is your function to take that
evidence and weigh that evidence and decide whether what that
doctor said as far as you are concerned made any sense at all. 3
In Jenkins, itself, in fact, a courtroom observer pointed
out that during the course of a psychologist's testimony,
the presiding trial judge "literally threw a deck of projec-
tive cards onto the floor."" Finally, a Jenkins analysis
concluded by asking rhetorically:
[Wihat significance will the jury attach to the defense
psychologist's testimony when confronted with the conflicting
testimony of the state's psychiatrist? Will recitation to the jury
of the psychiatrist's qualifications, which will include a medical
degree, have any prejudicial effect on the defendant who pro-
duces a psychologist? [Emphasis added.
4
1
The treatment of the problem and answers to these ques-
tions must be dealt with openly and completely by forensic
psychologists.
In addition, of course, the forensic psychologist must also
be looking over his/her other flank at the forensic
psychiatrists who are still uncomfortable about the
newcomer's involvement (spelled "usurpation" in some
quarters). Thus, in the 1972 case I spoke of a moment
earlier (where the prosecution said "After all, they are just
blots of ink"), the American Psychiatric Association filed
an amicus brief, clearly labeling such forensic
psychologists as "laymen" in relation to the diagnosis of
"mental illnesses or defects."" 6 According to the eminent
professor of law and psychiatry Richard Allen, the
Psychiatric Association's ultimate objective is "quite clear:
reversal of Judge Bazelon's decision in Jenkins"47-this
spectre must be a serious subject of consideration for the
forensic psychologist.
The progenesis of this attitude, of course, cannot be laid
solely, or even, perhaps, predominantly, at the feet of the
legal or psychiatric profession. At base, this social status
must be seen as a reflection on the self-perceptions held by
many psychologists of their potential courtroom role.
Although it was a lawyer who noted that the traditional
limitation in courtroom participation "comes not only
from the law, but also from the inhibitions of
psychologists,"4 8 it is clearly very often the "fault" of the
psychologists themselves that their forensic role has been
so truncated. Indeed, Louisell's observation some 20 years
ago that "psychologists . . . often seem to display an un-
due hesitancy, amounting almost to fear, to taking the
witness stand,"4 9 is still all too valid in too many in-
stances."°
Thus, Douglas Sargent-a psychiatrist-has noted that a
forensic psychiatrist is "annoyed by the limitations which
legal procedures place on his testimony, impatient with the
stilted rituals of courtroom etiquette, intrigued by the
law's archaic language" and that this response creates an
"unfortunate polarization of attitudes . . . [leading to] a
hostile parody of the truth."'" The substitution of "psy-
chologist" for "psychiatrist" in that sentence would ring
similarly true, to many. In addition, forensic psychologists
must confront the fact that they cannot "behave in the
courtroom as though the issues were settled";2 transcripts
such as those reproduced by Jeffery as part of an NIMH
project reveal forensic psychological witnesses whose
demeanor-in important, otherwise well-prepared, serious
criminal cases-ranges from obstinate to condescending to
PSYCHOLOGISTS IN THE COURTROOM
patronizing to omniscient. 51 In the vernacular, some foren-
sic psychologists must "clean up their act."
Louisell's quotation from Julius Caesar ("the fault, dear
Brutus, is not in our stars,/But in ourselves, that we are
underlings"),54 again, serves as an effective epigram: foren-
sic psychologists must confront the reasons why they have
both been treated as second-class citizens in the court and
why they see themselves in that role. Thus, the heralded
Competency Screening Index, prepared by the Laboratory
of Community Psychiatry in conjunction with NIMH,
establishes a sentence-completion test for the purpose of
"quickly screening defendants" to make recommendations
as to their competency to stand trial.5" It is geared to
determine whether an individual defendant meets the three-
pronged common-law test for competency (ability to
cooperate with counsel, understand nature of proceedings,
understand consequences of proceedings), and, in fact,
may effectively do so. 6 However, a witness who ad-
ministers and then testifies to the results 'of a test such as
this must be aware of-and must be able to deal with-the
pitfalls of probing cross-examination, a skeptical judge,
and, on occasion, an incredulous jury. To paraphrase
Shakespeare again, the forensic psychologist must be as
well-prepared and comprehending as Caesar's wife needed
to be pure.
Although this picture has been, admittedly, somewhat
gloomy, it should also be encouraging to the forensic
psychologist. The cases which I have referred to-espe-
cially the noncriminal ones-can serve as a meaningful op-
portunity through which psychologists can-and should-
push for further involvement in the judicial process, on at
least three separate levels.
First, the special assessment, testing and intellectual/per-
sonality evaluation skills and techniques possessed by
clinical psychologists uniquely prepare them for much
courtroom work,17 in areas referred to above, as well as
such newly emerging areas as ferreting out cultural test
biases,58 a role they will better be able to play if they
become-in the phrase of Stanley Brodsky and Ames
Robey-'"courtroom-oriented" and discard their usual
"courtroom-unfamiliar" pose. 9 Second, it is clear that
testimony in civil rights/class actions gives the forensic
psychologist a tremendous opportunity "to contribute to
social change,"" as an "advocate and facilitator,"' 6' while
fulfilling his/her role as part of a "socially concerned
system." ' 62 As a corollary to both these reasons, it should
also be pointed out that forensic psychologists are re-
markably successful when they go to court-in 70 percent
of a group of cases studied, the verdict was in favor of the
side on which the psychologists testified. 63
Finally, it is 6lear that the courts are more ready for the
forensic psychologist. As indicated above, legal barriers to
testimony have virtually disappeared. 64 One commentator
calls the clinical psychologist "worthy of our consideration
in the seeking of new and improved trial techniques;
65
another questions how long the law can "lag behind scien-
tific fact and common knowledge"; 66 a third argues that
the psychologist "can contribute in the courtroom toward
a better understanding of emotional illness." ' 67 Interesting-
ly, this final commentator points out how psychology's
struggle for acceptance as a scientific and objective
discipline familiarizes the psychologist with ways to over-
come the shortcomings of such tools as projective tests and
uniquely prepares him/her for the rigors of cross-
examination.68 It thus remains only for the psychological
community to openly confront the reasons which have
perpetuated the anticourtroom bias and to educate all par-
ticipants in the litigation process to the need for (and
uniqueness of) appropriate psychological testimony.
In a 1961 article, Norma Scheflen-a research psychologist
at Temple University-quoted the famous law dean John
Wigmore as stating "whenever the psychologist is really
ready for the courts, the courts are ready for him.' '69
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Although Dr. Scheflen prophesied that "the time is now"
15 years ago, it is unfortunate that history has not yet
truly borne her out. Perhaps now, finally, it will.
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